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The PROBLEM :  
GAO Found Award/Incentive Fee Generally Ineffective
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Background
Why GAO Did This Study 
GAO was asked to determine 
whether award and incentive fees 
have been used effectively as a tool 
for achieving DOD’s desired 
acquisition outcomes. To do this, 
GAO selected a probability sample 
of 93 contracts from the study 
population of 597 DOD award- and 
incentive-fee contracts that were 
active and had at least one contract 
action valued at $10 million or more 
from fiscal year 1999 through 2003
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Incentive Contracts Have Been Used in 
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Cost Plus Award Fee
Cost Plus Incentive Fee
Fixed Price Incentive Fee
Award Fee Base  0-3%
Award Fee Pool
PTA
Simplified View of Incentive Contracts  
INCENTIVE CONTRACTS 
(FAR 16.401)
• Designed to obtain specific acquisition
objectives
• Establishes reasonable and 
attainable targets that are clearly 
communicated
• Includes appropriate incentive 
arrangements designed to:
- Motivate contractor efforts that might 
not otherwise be emphasized
- Discourage contractor inefficiency 
and waste
Incentive Contracts:  
A Sampling of Recent Assessments and Guidance  
Army (ACA) Award Fee Board Member 
Guide (September 2003) 
Air Force (AFMC) Award Fee & Award 
Term Guide, Dec 2002
Air Force (Secretary of the Air Force) Contract 
Incentives Policy 06A-003 - April 04, 2006
Air Force Award Fee Guide - March 2002
DFARS SUBPART 216.4--INCENTIVE 
CONTRACTS (Revised March 21, 2006)
USAID Guidance for Award 
Fee Contracting
Air Force (SAF/AQC) Award Term/Incentive 
Options Guide - January 2003
Army (ACA) Award Fee Contracts Guide 
(September 2003)
Army (ACA) Cost & Price Analysis 
Handbook, February 2004
Army (U.S. Army Audit Agency) - Best 
Practices for Using Award Fees, Audit Report 
AA 01-169, February 2001
2001 Incentive Strategies for Defense 
Acquisitions Guide
OUSD Award Fee Contracts (FAR 16, DFARS 215, 
DFARS 216) Policy Memo, March 29, 2006
DCAA Contract Audit Manual, March 2006
2006 Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition 
Directorate (SAF/AQX) Contract Incentives Study
Air Force Space Command’s Space & Missile 
Center (SMC) 2006 Draft Incentives Guide
2007 National Defense Authorization Act, PUBLIC 
LAW 109–364—OCT. 17, 2006, SEC. 814
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Award and Incentive Fee Contracts 
Study Proposal
Why GAO Did This Study 
GAO was asked to determine 
whether award and incentive fees 
have been used effectively as a tool 
for achieving DOD’s desired 
acquisition outcomes. To do this, 
GAO selected a probability sample 
of 93 contracts from the study 
population of 597 DOD award- and 
incentive-fee contracts that were 
active and had at least one contract 
action valued at $10 million or more 
from fiscal year 1999 through 2003
Incentive Contracts Research Overview Briefing
Defense Acquisition University (DAU), 17 May 2007
• The Implementation of Award/Incentive Fee contracts in DoD are not 
producing the desired/intended outcomes.  In some cases, the Acquisition 
community may not be implementing Award Fee/Incentive contracts, correctly. 
Research Objective
• DAU needs to understand where Award Fee/Incentive Fee made a 
favorable difference and why. 
The Teams’ Outcome Will Be A Research Project Rather than a Re-clama
to the GAO Findings
Problem Statement
Research Problem Statement & Objective 
Multi-Regional
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1.  Improved Contractor Performance Has Not Always Been Achieved Through the 
Use Of Award Fee/Incentive Fee Contracts.
2. GAO Has Identified Numerous Award/Incentive Fee Contracts that Have Cost 
the Government Millions Without Always Producing Desired Contractual 
Outcomes.
3.  In DoD Contracting, Award/Incentive Fee Contracts Can Be Powerful Tools to 
Favorably Influence Contractor Performance in conjunction with good acquisition 
fundamentals.
4. Empirical Evidence/Measurable Results Should Play a Pivotal Role In 
Award/Incentive Fee Determinations.
5. GAO Conclusions on the Ineffectiveness Of Award/Incentive Fee Contracting 
May Be A Result Of Certain Ineffective Practices that Could Be Undermining 
Policy
Exchange with  the GAO 
Met with Mr Tom Denomme and Mr Ron Schwenn on 20 Jun 06 at GAO HQ 
in DC— very informative exchange—their comments:
• Research effort looked for connection between AF/IF and favorable outcomes 
but they found little evidence to substantiate relationship
• Process seemed to be well understood—no chronic problems
• Found no issues with Policy
• Service Guidelines governing implementation of AF/IF is different—should it be?
• Award Fee sometimes drives requirements creep
• Performance outcomes were sometimes unrealistic--contractor couldn’t deliver
• Surprisingly, TPMs didn’t seem to play much into the equation 
• GAO did not evaluate weighting methodology--would it have made a difference?
• In some cases, AF was seen and used by PM as a “Risk Management” device—is 
that a bad idea?
• FDO’s final evaluation letters don’t contain much substantiation—why is it so 
general?
• The contractor isn’t encouraged to pursue alternate COAs especially if they or the 
government run into [anticipated] programmatic obstacles
Stage Setters Expectations? Metrics? Outcomes? General Categories?
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
1.0
Understand where Award Fee 






1.3.1 Subject Evaluation that 
drove outcomes1.2.1 Programmatic Hurdles
Survey Approach Used A WBS Approach






1.2.3  Pushing 
Technology Envelope
1.2.2 Technology Hurdles
1.2.4 Strong links to 
Performance
1.2.5 Technical Impediments
1.2.6 Use of EVMS
1.3.2 Changes to Criteria that 
drove Outcomes
1.3.3 Balance between Subject 
& Objective 
1.3.4 Scoring Methodology 
1.3.5 Scoring Methodology & 
relationship to outcomes
1.3.6 Criteria weighting
1.3.7 Subjective vs Objective  
1.3.8 Reason for Base Fee and % 
selected




1.4.4 Unintended Consequences 
& Determinations 
1.4.5 Unintended Consequences 
and authority of action
1.4.6  Unintended Consequences 
and Favorable impacts
1.4.2 Actions that Influenced 
Technical Risks
1.5.1 Award Fee Authority
1.5.2  Difference between FDO 
and PM
1.5.3 FDO Determination & 
Influence on Outcomes
1.5.4 Award  Period Length
1.5.5 PMO View of Award Fee  
Strategy
1.5.6 Criteria Changes in 
Subsequent periods
1.5.7 Contractor View of Award Fee  
Strategy
1.5.8 Reasons if Award Fee 
Strategy is seen as ineffective
1.5.9 Changes required to 
influence outcomes
1.5.10 Other Interviewee Comments 
Data Collection Instrument
INCENTIVE FEE and AWARD FEE SURVEY QUESTIONS 
 
SECTION I. PROGRAMMATICS 
 
 1.  What best describes your program? 
  a. ACAT I 
  b. ACAT IA 
  c. ACAT II 
  d. ACAT III 
  e. Other 
 
 2. What best characterizes your program phase? 
 a. System Development & Demonstration 
 b. Production and Deployment 
c. Operations & Support 
d. Other 
 
     3. What is your service component? 
  a.   Army 
  b.   Navy 
  c.  Air Force 
d.   Other 
 
 4. What is your principle role? 
  a.  Program Manager/Director/Project Manager 
  b.   Contracting Officer 
c. Systems Engineer 
d. Other 
 
 5. Did you choose an incentive fee or award fee contract? 
  a.  Incentive Fee 
  b.  Award Fee 
c. Award Fee with Incentives 
d. Other 
 
6.  What were the principal reasons you selected the type of contract in your answer to 
question 5?  
 
7.  If you chose an Incentive Fee, go to Section II. 
 
8.  If you chose an Award Fee, go to Section III 
 
SECTION II:  INCENTIVE FEE (defined as CPIF and FPIF type contracts) 
 
 A.  EXPECTATIONS  
  1.  What incentives did you use? 
  2.  Why did you choose these incentives? 
  3.  Did the incentives you chose create a strong link to favorable outcomes? How so? 
 4.  If you faced funding issues, what actions did you implement with your  
      contractor to help sustain favorable performance outcomes? 
 
 B.  METRICS 
1.   How did you determine the minimum and maximum fees associated with cost that 
motivated the contractor to perform effectively? 
2. What metric(s) did you use to incentivize performance other than cost and what type 
of methodology did you use? 
3. How did your methodology lead to favorable performance outcomes? 
 
 C.  OUTCOMES 
1.  Did the contractor stay within the cost, schedule and performance parameters?  If not, 
what were the outcomes in terms of cost, schedule and performance? 
2.  If as a result of the incentives used there were unexpected consequences, how did you 
mitigate those consequences in future periods? 
3.  In retrospect, which of the incentives that you used worked best to either mitigate or 
overcome unintended consequences and still promote favorable impacts on 
performance outcomes? 
 
 D. GENERAL CATEGORY 
 1.  How does your organization view your Incentive Fee strategy? Please elaborate after 
your response. 
       a.  Very effective in motivating the contractor? 
       b.  Moderately effective in motivating the contractor 
c. Somewhat in motivating the contractor 
d. Not very effective in motivating the contractor 
 
2.  If you answered “D” above, what is the principle reason your organization might view 
     Incentive Fee as “not very effective”?  Please elaborate after your response. 
     a.  Not everyone is well-trained on Incentive Fee. 
     b.  Not everyone is aware of the complicating factors that are considered in identifying 
          and developing the incentives. 
c. Other (explain) 
 
3.  How does your contractor view your Incentive Fee strategy? 
 a.  Very Effective 
 b.  Moderately effective 
 c.  Not very effective 
4.  In retrospect, what changes, if any, would you make to the Incentive Fee strategy to 
     influence performance outcomes even more? 
 a.  None—it worked just fine 
 b. More vigorously apply  . . .   
5.  What other comments do you have concerning incentive fees? 
SECTION III.   AWARD FEE (Defined as CPAF and FPAF type contracts) 
        
 A.  EXPECTATIONS 
  1.  What were your primary programmatic hurdles? 
  2.  What were your primary technology hurdles? 
  3.  Where are you pushing the technology envelope? 
  4.  What were your award fee objectives that created a strong link to favorable outcomes? 
  5.  How did you establish the criteria used in the award fee periods? 
  6.  What programmatic and/or technical impediments were understood and successfully  
       reconciled during the Award Fee periods? 
  7.  Did you and, if so, how did you use EVMS to influence favorable outcomes? 
  8.  If you faced funding issues, what Award Fee actions did you implement with your      
      contractor to help sustain favorable performance outcomes? 
 
 B. METRICS 
  1.  What were your subjective evaluation criteria that drove favorable outcomes? 
 2.  What changes did you make to the award fee criteria in subsequent award fee periods            
that drove favorable outcomes and why? 
  3.  How did you determine the balance/share between subjective and objective measures  
      and what had the most favorable impact on performance outcomes? 
  4.  What was your scoring methodology? 
  5.  How did your scoring methodology (and rating definitions) lead to favorable        
      performance outcomes? 
  6.  What criteria did you weigh more heavily that had favorable impacts on performance   
       outcomes? 
  7.  What did you weigh evenly and why did this weighting have favorable impacts on     
       performance outcomes? 
  8.  Could you have replaced any of the subjective criteria with objective criteria and still    
      have favorable impacts on performance outcomes?  If so, what were they?   
 9.  If you used a Base Fee, why did you use it and what was the fee percentage? 
 
 C.  OUTCOMES 
  1.  What specific Award Fee actions did you take that favorably reduced: 
        a.  Programmatic risks? 
        b.  Technical risks? 
  2.  In retrospect, what worked consistently in the Award Fee plan that influenced     
      favorable performance outcomes? 
3a. If your expected performance outcomes led to unintended consequences,        
how did you mitigate those unintended consequences during the next period? 
3b. Did those unintended consequences have an impact on the award fee given to the 
contractor? 
3c. Did you have the authority to change or eliminate that particular award fee criteria as 
a result of unintended consequences? 
  3d. In retrospect, what methods did you find that worked best to either mitigate or     
     overcome unintended consequences and still promote favorable impacts on       
       performance outcomes? 
 
 D.  GENERAL CATEGORY 
  1.  Who made the final Award Fee determination? 
Under Configuration Control: 2006 0702 Version 6  
2. If the Award Fee Determination Official (FDO) was different from the Program   
Manager/Program Director, was the Award Fee decision different than what the PM 
recommended?  If so, why?  
3.  H w did the FDO determination favorably influence the expected outcome? 
4   If earlier Award Fee decisions realized less tangible outcomes, what subjective or 
objective criteria/weighting were changed in subsequent award fee periods to  
influence favorable performance outcomes and why?  
  5.  What is the length of time between your award fee periods?  Why did you select that  
      p riod of time?  Were they too short or too long? 
 6.  How does your organization view your Award Fee strategy? Please elaborate after 
your response. 
       a.  Very effective in motivating the contractor 
       b.  Moderately effective in motivating the contractor 
       c.  Som what effective in motivating the contractor 
c. Not very effective in motivating the contractor. 
 
 7.  If you answered “D” above, what is the principle reason your organization might view  
Award Fee as “not very effective”? Please elaborate after your response. 
  .  Not veryone is well-trained on Award Fee 
       b.  Not everyone is aware of the complicating factors that are considered in the 
            decisi n equation. 
   c.  Other 
 
  8.  How does your contractor view your Award Fee strategy? 
9. In retrospect, what changes, if any, would you make to the Award Fee Plan to       
influence performance outcomes even more? 
10. What has been your Contractor response to your determinations?  
11. What other comments to you have concerning Award Fee? 
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Award and Incentive Fee Contracts 
Study Findings
Why GAO Did This Study 
GAO was asked to determine 
whether award and incentive fees 
have been used effectively as a tool 
for achieving DOD’s desired 
acquisition outcomes. To do this, 
GAO selected a probability sample 
of 93 contracts from the study 
population of 597 DOD award- and 
incentive-fee contracts that were 
active and had at least one contract 
action valued at $10 million or more 
from fiscal year 1999 through 2003
Incentive Contracts Research Overview Briefing
Defense Acquisition University (DAU), 17 May 2007
Stage Setters Expectations? Metrics? Outcomes? General Categories?




1.3.1 Subject Evaluation that 






1.2.3  Pushing 
Technology Envelope
1.2.2 Technology Hurdles
1.2.4 Strong links to 
Performance
1.2.5 Technical Impediments
1.2.6 Use of EVMS
1.3.2 Changes to Criteria that 
drove Outcomes
1.3.3 Balance between Subject 
& Objective 
1.3.4 Scoring Methodology 
1.3.5 Scoring Methodology & 
relationship to outcomes
1.3.6 Criteria weighting
1.3.7 Subjective vs Objective  
1.3.8 Reason for Base Fee and % 
selected




1.4.4 Unintended Consequences 
& Determinations 
1.4.5 Unintended Consequences 
and authority of action
1.4.6  Unintended Consequences 
and Favorable impacts
1.4.2 Actions that Influenced 
Technical Risks
1.5.1 Award Fee Authority
1.5.2  Difference between FDO 
and PM
1.5.3 FDO Determination & 
Influence on Outcomes
1.5.4 Award  Period Length
1.5.5 PMO View of Award Fee  
Strategy
1.5.6 Criteria Changes in 
Subsequent periods
1.5.7 Contractor View of Award Fee  
Strategy
1.5.8 Reasons if Award Fee 
Strategy is seen as ineffective
1.5.9 Changes required to 
influence outcomes
1.5.10 Other Interviewee Comments 
• Establish Open dialogue at both Junior and Senior levels 
• Ensure that Contractor is never surprised by what th y g t 
• Employ “Emphasis letters” or “Barometer reports” duri g 
award periods to stress the importance of certain 
“outcomes” or “events”
• Conduct Monthly reviews
• Set and Maintain Unequivocal Expectations
• Enforce a strongly prepared and focused evaluation boar  
that also garners upper management support 
1.  Strongly Communicate Expectations and Continually 
Provide Feedback
. . . and the Findings Say: 
. . . and the Findings Say: 
Stage Setters Expectations? Metrics? Outcomes? General Categories?




1.3.1 Subject Evaluation that 






1.2.3  Pushing 
Technology Envelope
1.2.2 Technology Hurdles
1.2.4 Strong links to 
Performance
1.2.5 Technical Impediments
1.2.6 Use of EVMS
1.3.2 Changes to Criteria that 
drove Outcomes
1.3.3 Balance between Subject 
& Objective 
1.3.4 Scoring Methodology 
1.3.5 Scoring Methodology & 
relationship to outcomes
1.3.6 Criteria weighting
1.3.7 Subjective vs Objective  
1.3.8 Reason for Base Fee and % 
selected




1.4.4 Unintended Consequences 
& Determinations 
1.4.5 Unintended Consequences 
and authority of action
1.4.6  Unintended Consequences 
and Favorable impacts
1.4.2 Actions that Influenced 
Technical Risks
1.5.1 Award Fee Authority
1.5.2  Difference between FDO 
and PM
1.5.3 FDO Determination & 
Influence on Outcomes
1.5.4 Award  Period Length
1.5.5 PMO View of Award Fee  
Strategy
1.5.6 Criteria Changes in 
Subsequent periods
1.5.7 Contractor View of Award Fee  
Strategy
1.5.8 Reasons if Award Fee 
Strategy is seen as ineffective
1.5.9 Changes required to 
influence outcomes
1.5.10 Other Interviewee Comments 
2.  Use Relevant, Achievable and Enduring Measures 
Within an Evaluation Period
• “Hard-wire” measures to achievable outcomes
• Employ technical performance goals and cost controls
• Jointly develop incentive criteria with contractors since they 
tend to be mor  strongly correlated to outcomes 
• Select Key outcomes that make evaluation periods more 
enduring by creating a bridge between one award f e period 
and the next
• Use subjective measures to dri e critical processes, 
management responsivenes , nd certain behavior
• Institute a combined objective and subjective measures 
strategy
Stage Setters Expectations? Metrics? Outcomes? General Categories?




1.3.1 Subject Evaluation that 






1.2.3  Pushing 
Technology Envelope
1.2.2 Technology Hurdles
1.2.4 Strong links to 
Performance
1.2.5 Technical Impediments
1.2.6 Use of EVMS
1.3.2 Changes to Criteria that 
drove Outcomes
1.3.3 Balance between Subject 
& Objective 
1.3.4 Scoring Methodology 
1.3.5 Scoring Methodology & 
relationship to outcomes
1.3.6 Criteria weighting
1.3.7 Subjective vs Objective  
1.3.8 Reason for Base Fee and % 
selected




1.4.4 Unintended Consequences 
& Determinations 
1.4.5 Unintended Consequences 
and authority of action
1.4.6  Unintended Consequences 
and Favorable impacts
1.4.2 Actions that Influenced 
Technical Risks
1.5.1 Award Fee Authority
1.5.2  Difference between FDO 
and PM
1.5.3 FDO Determination & 
Influence on Outcomes
1.5.4 Award  Period Length
1.5.5 PMO View of Award Fee  
Strategy
1.5.6 Criteria Changes in 
Subsequent periods
1.5.7 Contractor View of Award Fee  
Strategy
1.5.8 Reasons if Award Fee 
Strategy is seen as ineffective
1.5.9 Changes required to 
influence outcomes
1.5.10 Other Interviewee Comments 
3.  Use Base Fee in Award Fee Contracts
• Set aside a portion of the award fee funding for “best 
efforts”
• Set aside a portion of th  award fee funding to giv  
ample flexibility for “excellence”
• Fa tor in the view of Se i r defense industry 
personnel—they welcomed the use of bas  fee to b tter 
delineate the difference between “best efforts” (e.g. fee) 
and “excellence” (e.g. w rd)
. . . and the Findings Say: 
Stage Setters Expectations? Metrics? Outcomes? General Categories?




1.3.1 Subject Evaluation that 






1.2.3  Pushing 
Technology Envelope
1.2.2 Technology Hurdles
1.2.4 Strong links to 
Performance
1.2.5 Technical Impediments
1.2.6 Use of EVMS
1.3.2 Changes to Criteria that 
drove Outcomes
1.3.3 Balance between Subject 
& Objective 
1.3.4 Scoring Methodology 
1.3.5 Scoring Methodology & 
relationship to outcomes
1.3.6 Criteria weighting
1.3.7 Subjective vs Objective  
1.3.8 Reason for Base Fee and % 
selected




1.4.4 Unintended Consequences 
& Determinations 
1.4.5 Unintended Consequences 
and authority of action
1.4.6  Unintended Consequences 
and Favorable impacts
1.4.2 Actions that Influenced 
Technical Risks
1.5.1 Award Fee Authority
1.5.2  Difference between FDO 
and PM
1.5.3 FDO Determination & 
Influence on Outcomes
1.5.4 Award  Period Length
1.5.5 PMO View of Award Fee  
Strategy
1.5.6 Criteria Changes in 
Subsequent periods
1.5.7 Contractor View of Award Fee  
Strategy
1.5.8 Reasons if Award Fee 
Strategy is seen as ineffective
1.5.9 Changes required to 
influence outcomes
1.5.10 Other Interviewee Comments 
4.  Institute Training and Leverage Experienced 
Personnel to the Maximum Extent
• Incorporate the practical experience of many
already embedded talented personnel
• Establish formalized instruction and continue to coach 
personnel on use of incentives
• Require perfor ance monitors to observ  other 
assessments to help them appreciat  th  depth of 
evaluations
• Encourage “Specialty” training for key personnel ho 
administer incentive contracts
. . . and the Findings Say: 
“ Government Construction of the Award Fee Plan (Including Metrics, Incentives, etc.) 
May Not Link With the Offeror’s Proposed Solution Or Motivations
• Award Fee Sometimes isn’t Proper Contract Type to Achieve Program Outcomes
• In Some Cases, the Intended Goal(s) of Award Fee Contracts are Unclear
• Contracts Without Base Fee Can Cause Problems
• In Some Cases, the Government Does Not Follow Its Own Policies On Award Fee
• On Occasion, Award Fee Evaluation Criteria Are Poorly Explained Or Justified and 
Communication of Award Fee Goals and Criteria Are Not Clearly Explained
• It Is Difficult to Establish the Relationship Between Awards For month-to-month 
Activities to the Goals Of A Multiple-Year Program.  The Linkage Is Not Always 
Apparent
• Administration of Award Fee Criteria Can Change Post Award and Create Problems 
During Contract Execution
• Government May Not Manage Or Evaluate Award Fee Criteria as Agreed /Planned
• Post-award administration of Award Fee contracts is time and resource intensive
20 July 2006 Industry Day Themes collected at DAU Headquarters
20 July 2006 Industry Day Themes collected at DAU Headquarters
5.  Carefully Weigh Industry Concerns 
. . . and th  Findings Say: 
• Government Personnel Are Not Adequately Trained in Managing Award Fee Contracts
• Desired Outcomes Are Not Always Driven By The Award Fee Because Of Insufficient 
Funds Available and Subjectivity Of The Final Evaluation. 
• Inconsistency In the Timing Of the Award In Line With The Evaluation Criteria 
And Uncertainly Of Expected Profitability Before Award Pose Additional Problems
• Contracting Parties /Stakeholders have Different Perceptions of Award Fees
Purposes
• In Some Cases, There Is Government Failure to Understand the Economics of 
Defense Contracting and Its Impact On Government Contractors
• From Time to Time, There is Inappropriate Use Of Award Fee Contracts
• Award fee is not targeted at creating fair shareholder value (or financial advantage to
the private company) in line with actual performance. Metrics are sometimes not 
meaningful and are "fuzzy" in line with "fuzzy" requirements. Sometimes they are too  
subjective and do not measure outcomes that are sought by DoD
• Award fees that require the contractor to exceed the requirements of the contract 
motivate requirements creep or “goldplating”
. . . and the Findings Say: 
20 July 2006 Industry Day Themes collected at DAU Headquarters
5.  Carefully Weigh Industry Concerns 
. 
Award and Incentive Fee Contracts 
Recommendations
Why GAO Did This Study 
GAO was asked to determine 
whether award and incentive fees 
have been used effectively as a tool 
for achieving DOD’s desired 
acquisition outcomes. To do this, 
GAO selected a probability sample 
of 93 contracts from the study 
population of 597 DOD award- and 
incentive-fee contracts that were 
active and had at least one contract 
action valued at $10 million or more 
from fiscal year 1999 through 2003
Incentive Contracts Research Overview Briefing
Defense Acquisition University (DAU), 17 May 2007
• Maximize two existing Continuous Learning Modules (CLMs) to help 
guide organizations with their incentive selection and subsequent 
pathway.
- Contractual Incentives (CLC-018): focuses on balance between 
government and industry goals and objectives in crafting an 
effective incentive strategy
- Provisional Award Fees (CLC-034): addresses the new 2003 rule 
that permits award fee payments to be made anytime prior to the 
interim or final evaluation.  
• Exploit the increasingly popular collaborative medium called 
Communities of Practices (COPs)—DAU has already established a 
site on the ACC, “Award and Incentive Fee Contracts.”
(https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=105550).
- Provides access to a wide array of documented lessons learned 
regarding incentives
- Provides the community a bridge to the source of experts who 
face incentive challenges every day
- Reinforces useful incentive practices and techniques
• Develop a much more comprehensive Incentive Contracts CLM
Recommendations
David M. Walker
Comptroller General of the United States 
December 21, 2006  Responses to the Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations, 
House of Representatives
2. Do you believe they are an effective way to create incentives with contractors? In 
other words, do they improve contractor performance?
Award and incentive fees can be an effective tool if properly designed and effectively administered. 
However, for these fees to be effective, DOD must address the underlying problems in its acquisition 
system and more directly link the fees to the outcomes it wants. Because the weapon system programs 
that result from this system are in many cases unexecutable and/or subject to changing “requirements” or 
funding levels, DOD has been unwilling to hold its programs or its contractors accountable for achieving 
the very acquisition outcomes it has identified. As a result, fees are paid even when outcomes do not 
meet expectations. Addressing these broader acquisition issues and strengthening the link between fees 
and acquisition outcomes can increase the accountability of DOD programs for fees paid, of contractors 
for results achieved, and the likelihood that these fees will motivate the contractors and be an effective 
tool for the government.
3. Do you believe we should discontinue the use of award and incentive fees?
No, we do not believe they should be discontinued. Award and incentive fees can be useful if they are 
used in the appropriate setting. Each contract type has a use based on the level of risk involved. The 
problem occurs when you proceed into programs without realistic requirements and sufficiently mature 
technologies on which to base realistic cost and schedule estimates and attempt to offset that increased 
risk by offering award fees to motivate the contractor to overcome that risk. The important question is: 
Have you adequately defined and established appropriate criteria that enable you to measure outcomes? 
And finally, how do you apply those criteria in determining the level of fee that can be justified? We have 
made several recommendations to this effect, and DOD has responded favorably with new guidance to 
link award fees to acquisition outcomes. However, as with other recommendations we have made related 
to DOD weapon system acquisitions, the key will be how this new policy is implemented. 





Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF)
Relevant, Achievable and Enduring Measures 
Frequent and Unambiguous Communication/Feedback 
• Description • Description
Provides for a fee consisting of (1) a base amount fixed at 
inception of the contract and (2) an award amount that the 
contractor may earn in whole or in part during performance and 
that is sufficient to provide motivation for excellence in such 
areas as quality, timeliness, technical ingenuity, and cost-
effective management. The amount of the award fee to be paid is 
determined by the Government’s judgmental evaluation of the 
contractor’s performance in terms of the criteria stated in the 
contract. This determination and the methodology for 
determining the award fee are unilateral decisions made solely at 
the discretion of the Government.
Provides for the initially negotiated fee to be adjusted later by a 
formula based on the relationship of total allowable costs to total 
target costs; specifies a target cost, a target fee, minimum and
maximum fees, and a fee adjustment formula. After contract 
performance, the fee payable to the contractor is determined in 
accordance with the formula. The formula provides, within limits, 
for increases in fee above target fee when total allowable costs
are less than target costs, and decreases in fee below target fee 
when total allowable costs exceed target costs. This increase or
decrease is intended to provide an incentive for the contractor to 
manage the contract effectively. When total allowable cost is 
greater than or less than the range of costs within which the fee-
adjustment formula operates, the contractor is paid total 
allowable costs, plus the minimum or maximum fee
No Base Fee
• Motivates Contractor Efforts that Might not Otherwise be Emphasized
Incentive Contracts 
• Discourages Contractor Inefficiency And Waste
Base Fee
An Aggregate View
• Suitable when a firm-fixed-price contract is not appropriate  




Review GAO questionnaire and 
determine shortfalls and/or 
additional areas of interest/gaps
Prepare AT&L and DAU 
President letter to Program 
Offices among all Regions
Determine which 29 questions 
relate to the Research Teams’
Problem Statement
Meet with key GAO personnel 
and review source data
Regional team members 
nominate Program Office 
interview candidates
Develop database construct
Review GAO Report 06-490T
As a result of the release of the GAO’s recent publication on the ineffectiveness of Award and 
Incentive Contracts (e.g. “DoD Wastes Billions on Poorly Structured Incentives,“ GAO Report 
06-409T) the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) has embarked on a limited Research effort 
designed to better understand where Award/Incentive Fee Contract had a favorable impact on 
performance outcomes.   
 
To both bound and frame their study efforts the research team decided on a high level Problem 




• The implementation of Award/Incentive fee contracts in DoD are not producing the 
desired/intended outcomes.  In some cases, the Acquisition community may not be 




• Improved Contractor Performance Has Not Always Been Achieved Through the Use Of 
Award Fee/Incentive Fee Contracts.   
• GAO Has Identified Numerous Award/Incentive Fee Contracts that Have Cost the 
Government Millions Without Always Producing Desired Contractual Outcomes. 
• In DoD Contracting, Award/Incentive Fee Contracts Can Be Powerful Tools to Favorably 
Influence Contractor Performance. 
• Empirical Evidence/Measurable Results Should Play a Pivotal Role In Award/Incentive 
Fee Determinations. 
• GAO Conclusions on the Ineffectiveness Of Award/Incentive Fee Contracting May Be A 
Result Of Certain Ineffective Practices that Could Be Undermining Policy 
• The Teams’ Outcome Will Be A Research Project Rather than A Re-clama to The GAO 
Findings  
 
The research team’s last assumption is an imperative--they will not relama or duplicate the GAO 
study.  Instead, the research team will investigate where the extended acquisition community 
implemented effective practices which the entire acquisition community could perhaps leverage 
as best practices. 
 
The research team is on a very tight schedule and I ask your full cooperation in the coming weeks
as they collect meaningful data in the form of questionnaires and/or interviews.  They will 
provide more detail, shortly.  In the meantime, if you have any questions, please contact either of 
my co-leads for this effort, Mr Rob Tremaine (Robert.tremaine@dau.mil), or Mr Kevin Carman 
(Kevin.Carman @dau.mil). 
 




Mr Frank Anderson 
President, Defense Acquisition University 






























• Research Approach & 
Methodology 
- Ground rules & assumptions
- GAO Follow-up
- Incentives Defined








20 July 2006 Industry Day Themes collected at DAU HeadquartersManagement Deliberation Center
• State-of-the-art facility designed and 
developed to support group collaboration.
• Participants can contribute anonymously and 
simultaneously, or at different times. The 
software also collects and tabulates votes, 
graphically and statistically displays results, 
and accesses other packages and 
documents. 
